The PBS documentary Elusive Peace: Israel and the Arabs is a really informative work that gives a window into the complicated peace process that exists within the Middle East. With much of the details having occurred almost a dozen years ago, my knowledge is quite limited as my attention was directed towards other topics, not exactly Israel and Palestine. Perhaps the most eye opening aspect of the negotiations were just how big of a role theatrics. It was shocking to see and hear some of the methods that were resorted to by all sides.
The most glaring example of this can be seen when the two Middle Eastern leaders, Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, are seen trying to enter into the barracks at a site of peace talks here in the United States. After President Bill Clinton entered into the barracks, the two Middle Eastern leaders had an almost comical sequence where both were trying to get the other leader to enter first; it was Three Stooges-esqe. My take is what hope can there be for peace in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine when their leaders can not even do something as simple as walk through a door-way without starting some trouble.
The documentary as a whole was not overly optimistic towards peace being able to be reached. What is probably the most depressing feature is that the feeling I got was that both of the leaders, Arafat and Barak, truly wanted peace. In the beginning we see Barak and President Assad of Syria try to come to an agreement about the Golan Heights, a topic which Barak had started. While Barak would ultimately decide he could not discuss completely reverting back to the 1967 lines in Syria, I get the impression to do so would have been political suicide; and considering that peace with Syria was not the ultimate goal, it would not have made sense. As we saw when Barak started negotiations with Arafat, Israeli nationalists such as Ariel Sharon seized that opportunity to make their move. They argued that Barak was giving away Israel and did not have the best interests of Israel at heart. It was the “concessions” which Barak made to try and reach peace that sparked the switch to the Likud party and more importantly Ariel Sharon. I feel that while Barak may at times not have done all that he could have done to reach a peace agreement with Arafat; a peace was much more reachable under him than it was under Sharon. If for no other reason than that Sharon self-admittedly did not like nor trust Arafat at all. Sharon hampered the chances for peace quite a bit by virtually making Arafat a prisoner in the last months of his life, not allowing him to leave his compound in Palestine.
Elusive Peace a documentary directed by Norma Percy discussed the peace process that slipped through the fingers of the Palestinians, as Jerusalem became the focal point of what was to happen. Ehud Burak and Yassar Arafat dung the Camp David peace talks during the Clinton administration said Jerusalem was the point of it all. While Clinton to pressured Ehud Burak work on giving up East Jerusalem Ehud finally conceded and east Jerusalem along with the top of the temple mount to be that Palestinians capital. The problem was how Yassar Arafat. Was seen he would be assasinated if in fact he did not go along with what the Palestinians wanted which is the bottom of the temple mount as well. Although Ehud Burak quickly changed his opinin on not conceding Jerusalem to save face, he did not do that until Arafat said no to the peace plan concerning Israel.
Matters did not help during this time when Ariel Sharon visited the mosque on the temple mount from which an intifada stemmed. It seemed like Ariel Sharon was provoking the Palestinian people. Just like his ruthlessness, before in Lebanon he would be just as ruthless toward the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the repercussions after thirty Israelis died in a suicide bombing on Passover. Would this of happened had Camp David been successful? Would it not be something to have at least East Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital even if that did not include the bottom o the temple of the mount? While suicide bombing is an atrocious immoral act, after all what does an eleven year old have to do with the peace process, is a full scale military attack and siege killing many civilian Palestinians a necessary action? Whole neighborhoods were destroyed and while Yassar Arafat was under siege at his compound and quarantined there for 2 years until his death.
Yassar Arafat never saw the dismantling of settlements in Gaza Strip but because of this concession done by Ariel Sharon in return he wanted the United Sates to agree that there was no longer a right of return for Palestinian refugees and that the wall that infringed on Palestinian land past the 1967 green line was to stay the way it was. President Bush agreed and there again was a step backward toward a fair vision of how that Palestinian people should be viewed in this peace process. Come up with a peace process that all can agree on, dismantle settlements, give the Palestinians their land that goes back to the United Nations resolution 242 back to green line. Give East Jerusalem as their capital, tear down the wall, and stop checkpoints into Jerusalem so people can visit their holy sights. This is a lot to accomplish but if Israel concedes to Palestine truly and fairly, will there be a need for terrorist’s attacks? Unlikely as Jews and Palestinians lived harmoniously side-by-side before the 48 war they can again do the same if the average people of the countries, not the higher politicians have a say.
The Elusive Peace provided insight into not just the actions of the players involved in the peace process, but also into their points of view and thoughts which dictated those actions. One important element I learned from the movie is the importance that emotion and lack of trust play in the failures of talks. For instance, when the Israeli delegation landed in DC, Prime Minister Barak refused to get off the plane due to his fear of the political backlash he was sure would follow. Even though he had made a rational choice to negotiate face to face with the Syrians, Barak’s last minute fear and lack of trust of Assad almost prevented a meeting from happening. Though the meeting would end up happening, the Barak’s fears restricted him from making any real concessions.
This sense of distrust did not only affect the Israeli leader, however. When Clinton told Assad of Barak’s willingness to withdraw to a “commonly agreed upon border”, Assad’s became enraged. To Assad “commonly agreed upon border” really meant the Israelis believed “the Syrians will foul up the lake if we give them access to it.” Instead of working with the Israelis to come to some sort of compromise on the issue of land ownership around the lake, Assad was too offended by his counterpart to respond productively to his offer. While it is impossible to speculate whether a deal would have been made had the men been able to control their emotions and fears, these episodes would make sure that this historic meeting would become a historic failure.
As Barak moved from the failures of the Syrian negotiations and onto talks with Arafat and the Palestinians, emotion and lack of trust continued to play a pivotal role. Metaphorically and humorously displayed by Arafat and Barak as both men refused to walk through a door before the other, the amount of distrust held both sides back from the necessary prerequisites to a peace deal. Without the trust that the other side would meet them half way, the three leaders would fail to agree to a final status on Jerusalem, the most controversial issue of the talks. Barak expressed the situation by saying he felt like a trapeze artist about to make a jump, but he wasn’t sure his partner was ready to catch him. He feared that if he compromised even an inch on Jerusalem, and a deal fell through, his political opponents would call him a traitor to Israel. (This, in fact, would be the exact strategy deployed by Sharon to win the upcoming elections). Arafat had a similar anxiety, though he believed more than just his political career would die with if he made the wrong move. He feared that by agreeing to anything less than complete ownership over Al Haram Al Sharif would lead to his assassination. While Clinton attempted a last ditch effort, these fears would prove to be stronger than his negotiating skills.
Though The Elusive Peace highlights the failed Camp David negotiations, there are a lot of positives to take from the movie as well. Most importantly, we must understand the monumental accomplishment of both sides coming together to talk. Before the Oslo Accords in 1993, the mere idea that the Israeli Prime Minister would meet with Yasser Arafat to discuss the final status of Jerusalem was one held by dreamers alone. Furthermore, while the Israelis and Palestinians failed to agree on Jerusalem, they did come to an understanding on many of the other important issues. These tentative understandings are now the base for future negotiations.
Finally, we must learn the lessons from the failures of the past. The greatest lesson America must understand is that its presence is necessary if there is to be a deal. By getting personally involved in the conflict, Clinton came closer than any other President to achieving peace. Because of the distrust high levels of emotion between the Israelis and Palestinians, America is required to act as a moderate broker when the talks stall. The American President must successfully counteract the strong forces of fear and distrust which have plagued Israelis and Palestinians if America hopes to bring an end to this conflict.
I admit that I had heard only a very few arguments favoring Chairman Arafat’s position following Camp David, and while I sympathized with the Palestinians, I wasn’t certain of what exactly had been offered. I do know that the “deal” was alleged to be the “best deal the Palestinian people would ever receive.Since I watched this film, I have read a bit more about just what was actually offered at Camp David and it seems that the offers represented nothing new or different. The Palestinians were offered a state and a capital in Jerusalem in return for agreeing that this ended all claims on Israel. Fine, as far as it goes. But they were also offered about 92% of the territory in the West Bank and Gaza and they had a right to demand 100% of it. Israel retained control of Palestinian borders, but the Palestinians needed to control their own borders. Some sections of Arab Jerusalem would be incorporated into the Palestinian state, but Palestinians wanted all sections of Jerusalem with majority Arab populations to be included in their state. Free access to the holy sites of Islam and Christianity was offered as long as those sites were supervised by the Israeli army, but Palestinians expected free access without Israeli supervision. Israel would control the Temple Mount, but Palestinians demanded complete sovereignty over the Temple Mount, a sacred place to their faith. Israel would have retained a military presence in Palestine including check points it determined necessary, but Palestinians wanted no Israeli military presence and no checkpoints. Finally, since three million refugees would remain in refugee camps after negotiations were to have been completed, there is no way that Palestinians could sign off on all future claims against Israel. I am disappointed in the general media, and in the Jewish media in particular, for failing to report the specifics of the offers made.
This film illustrated the complete lack of trust between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. I thought it also showed the close ties between American and Israeli leaders that seem to take peace negotiations down the wrong course. In the beginning of the film, Clinton was even going so far as to admit that he was trying to “sell” a peace plan to the Palestinians on Barak’s behalf. A Palestinian negotiator saw the plan as a collection of hasty decisions which was not acceptable. This seemed to mirror the fact that the Clinton administration put the Camp David Accords together at the end of his second term as president.
During the process, the Americans and the Israelis worked out a plan that was acceptable for Israel, and then took that plan to the Palestinians. In the end, Barak would not give up Jerusalem because he saw it as political suicide. Arafat refused to sign a peace deal without some part of Jerusalem for the Palestinians because he, too, saw it as political suicide. Both sides balked on the same issue. However, at the end of the negotiations, it was the Palestinians who were labeled as terrorists who were impeding the peace process.
This film was very useful in giving viewers insight into the actual goings on during a peace negotiation. The scene where the two leaders could not agree on who would walk through the door first was simply ridiculous. There is a lot of symbolism involved in negotiations. That scene was one example, but during the process there is always the question of who is going to give up what for what purpose. Ideology, power, identity and security are only a few of the factors that go into the decision-making process. Jerusalem has been elevated to a symbol for both groups, and giving it up has come to mean giving up a peace of their identity. Either that perception will have to change for there to be peace, or there will need to be new leaders who are more committed to peace than to symbols.
I feel that this was a documentary that truly gives a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of peace talks, and, after having seen the film, it would be difficult for anyone to say that either side ‘doesn’t want peace’ or ‘isn’t willing to compromise.’ The peace process does not merely include those sitting at the negotiating table or the people whom they represent. This video shows how political climate and clout of others not at the negotiating table can influence those who are and how political support is so essential. For example, it seemed to me that Barak wanted to make further concessions and work towards peace; however, he knew that by doing so, he would be committing political suicide. For even the small concessions he offered, he highly criticized by Zionist extremists in the government upon his return. And then, to send the point home to the Palestinians that there would be no concessions, Sharon scheduled a walk around the captured Palestinian holy sites.
I picked up on a slightly less than hopeful outlook on future negotiations’ outcome throughout the documentary and can understand it. The documentary shows how, in order to achieve an acceptable and long-lasting peace, many variables must all simultaneously coalesce. Both Palestinian and Israeli negotiators need to be compromising actors with enough popularity from their constituents that they can confidently propose concessions without fear of their own political demise. In addition to this seemingly improbable set of circumstances, the US must have strong leadership and an administration that has accomplished an overhaul in foreign policy towards these negotiations. The US’s responsibility and role would have to be greater than currently whereby this country would stop diminishing its credibility with the Palestinians, hold both parties to their pre-established agreements, and stop letting either side influence US policy. With the need for all of these variables to simultaneously coalesce, one can understand the documentary’s bleak and dismal undertones.
This documentary focusing on the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis with the United States playing a mediating role helps us understand the lasting difficulty of these peace negotiations. The major players that were documented in this film were Prime Minister Ehud Barak for the Israeli camp, Yassir Arafat for the Palestinian camp, and the President Bill Clinton representing the mediating US camp. This film shows how difficult negotiating between the Israelis and the Palestinians can be and has been for several years, even with the strong hand of US intervention interceding to foster good relations.
The interesting thing to me about this documentary is the complete and utter reliance of the Israelis and Palestinians alike on the US mediation to ensure both side are represented fairly and equally. General opinion of the US and the west in the Middle East is unfavorable but the recurring need expressed by Arafat and the Palestinians for US involvement seems contrary to general public opinion.
There are several aspects of these Camp David negotiations which worked against the overall goal of a peace treaty. The major difficulties center around the negotiations regarding Jerusalem, which is an aspect of negotiations that neither the Israelis nor Palestinians were willing to make concessions. However the film plainly depicted these needs as being represented by their respective constituency. The personal views of both Barak and Arafat convey the want to make concessions on the topic of Jerusalem. However they both plainly state again, that making any concessions on Jerusalem will surely be received with contempt from their respective people and may even result in attempts on their life by their own people. This part of the film showed the true determination for these individual political players to make peace but bound by the limitations of holding a position which represents the larger constituency. This conflict increases the probability of peace negotiations failing at Camp David.
Another aspect of the Camp David negotiations which counter acted progression deals with the role of the US mediation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. President Bill Clinton allowed both parties to use him as a mediator and a facilitator for the peace negotiations. In the beginning, it was made clear that peace talks will be relayed from one side to President Clinton who would then present the terms to the opposing side. This set up for negotiating completely devauled the role of the President of the United States to a point where his influence and participation worked to make negotiations more complex rather than more conducive for peace. Due to the historical relations with Israel, President Clinton seemed to be more available to the Israeli side. Clinton would hear Barak's proposals and take them to Arafat who would always find problems and refuse. However Clinton did not always take Arafats plans back to Barak but rather went to Barak to reformulate their plan. This favoritism, whether consciously or unconsciously shown to the Israelis, worked to anger Arafat and the Palestinian camp to a point where they no longer trusted the American mediation to objectively conduct fair peace negotiations. This point was outlined in the book by Kurtzer and has proved to be the most apparent reason for the failures of the Camps David negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians brokered by US mediation.
One of the highlight’s of this course was the showing of the PBS documentary,“Elusive Peace”, which began with the Arafat-Barak meeting during the time period of 1999-2001. It is notable for its candid glimpses of personal distrust, anger and political fears and maneuvering. The Machiavellian themed ploys were text-book examples of how-not-to-negotiate-peace.
Barak’s strategy for dealing with Palestinians was to start side-negotiations with Syria,but Syria politely declined to participate in peace talks until Israel withdrew back from seized lands to pre-1967 borders. American Secretary of State Madeline Albright met with Assad thinking that Barak would then enter into meaningful peace negotiations; however, he refused because he felt that voters in Israel would reject his re-election if preconditions that showed Israeli land give-backs became an issue with his political opponents. The documentary suggests strongly that for the Israeli leadership, politics were more persuasive than peace. Barak claimed his rejection of Assad’s overtures was due to Israel’s need to maintain land around Sea of Galilee as it provides 30% of the nation’s fresh water. However this land was Syrian territory seized in 1967.
In Geneva in 2000 President Clinton invited Assad to a meeting in this neutral Swiss site as he believed that Israel would have specific peace plans to advance. Israel balked, embarrassed Clinton, the meeting failed: Assad died 3 months later. Without concern for American diplomacy or Syrian bitterness, Israel shrugged off this orchestrated failure with Syria and turned to Palestine. Barak, as further evidence that peace for Israel was a matter of tactical delays and anti-Palestinian accusations, continued to expand settlements, even as it cynically called for peace. But Arafat simultaneously called for East Jerusalem to be the Palestinian capital and Israeli capital, much like Rome is a two-nation capital: head of the Vatican and the Italian government. As Barak and Arafat played political chess, Clinton prepared a summit at Camp David for July 2000. Barak defiantly stated he would never agree to a two- country capital, primarily to appease hawks in Israel. As this part of the film made its points, it became obvious that politics and personal agendas dominate the peace process. I was amazed and angered that the USA initially and meekly allowed Barak to reject the American call for a two-state capital city. And this rudeness to Clinton and Arafat, after calling for the summit, was galling, especially his refusal to negotiate directly with Arafat. Clinton soon demanded that Barak be flexible and was visibly angry that he was being treated poorly by Israel. Barak kept up the pretense of serious negotiation by making a pathetic counter offer of a few villages outside Jerusalem .Clinton exploded, and demanded that Barak directly hand this unacceptable offer to Arafat as it wasn’t acceptable to the United States. The film poignantly sloshes through more jabbing as for example, Barak finally offered half of Jerusalem to Palestine(the Muslim and Christian quarters)and Arafat ‘s anger grew as Israeli’s tactics were insulting and humiliating, especially the demand to give up sovereignty over a holy Muslim site. Back in Israel, Sharon re-enters the ongoing saga with accusations that Barak is selling out. Angry and disappointed, Clinton went to Okinawa for the G-8 summit talks and left the two Middle East protagonists to work things out even as Sharon prepared to provoke Palestinians by walking with armed guards onto Temple Mount. Predictably, Palestinians protested, Israelis opened fire, killing seven Arabs, and peace talks ground to a halt. Just as Sharon and militant Arabs wanted. Elusive peace? No. Officially Sabotaged Peace is the accurate title.
Israel and the Arabs: An Elusive Peace gives a chronological account of the Camp David negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians with the United States as a mediator. I was surprised to see Ehud Barak's initial openness to peace negotiations with both Syria and Yassir Arafat. His decision to initiate peace talks and then back off is just one illustration of the numerous impediments to the peace process. The film switches from the accounts of the respective heads of state to their lower level staff. The film goes beyond the press releases shown on television and published in newspapers after these talks and gives us an opportunity to see the key players explain their thought process during the negotiations and their perceptions of everyone else involved.
My main question after watching this film is what could have happened if the peace negotiations had actually succeeded. If Ehud Barak had actually gone through with brokering a peace deal with Syria where would Israeli-Syrian relations be today? Had Ehub Barak been more flexible about meeting with Yassir Arafat himself could there have been more successful negotiations? Could they have been successful had Arafat accepted the plan presented to him? It's possible had the peace deal with Syria worked out in 2000, Iran would have far less leverage in the region than it does today. Beyond that it's difficult to say what actually could have happened. The fact that Ehud Barak stayed away from Yassir Arafat gives a rather bleak impression of Israel's openness to a bilateral peace agreement although it's possible reduced interaction could have helped in terms of reducing the number of harsh confrontation between the two. The documentary shows the difficult position Arafat was placed in by being presented with such a bad peace deal. Although the blame is typically placed on Arafat for saying no, the film shows just how raw the deal really was.
The Elusive Peace detailed the actions of the major players during the Clinton administration, as well as how and why the talks broke down. The two major negotiations depicted in the film were the Syrian negotiations, and the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the United States. There were some common themes we can gather from each negotiation, and use as lessons for future U.S. negotiating strategy.
First, it is clear that U.S. mediation is a necessary precondition for any peace talks to be successful or productive. In the cases present in the movie, distrust and harsh rhetoric proved a sufficient barrier to productive negotiation, so a middle-man role would be important to the talks. This role has some necessary parts. First, ample preparation is necessary, as entering negotiations with an empty satchel proved disastrous twice in the film. In Syria, the talks lasted a very short time due to a lack of U.S. alternative plans and detailed strategy. In Camp David, the U.S. did not have sufficient alternative solutions, and was reduced to being an emmissary from Israel. Secondly, the U.S. should develop a firm independent policy, and not allow itself to act on the whims of other actors, as it has for Israel in the past.
The other main theme that U.S. negotiators can remember for successful future peace talks is that Presidential action should be thought out carefully, and employed strategically. The devotion that President Clinton displayed towards achieving an agreement was commendable, but his actions served to devalue the role of the office at times. In the future, lower level emmissaries should be utilized before the president, especially when the U.S. is not adequately prepared for a conclusive peace negotiation. Therefore, the prestige of the office will be greater, and thus more effective in the fewer instances that it is utilized, and could perhaps increase the chances for success. For example, when Clinton met with Assad in Syria, he was unprepared, and thus demonstrated a reduced capacity for negotiations. As a result Assad would perhaps be less likely to accept invitations to negotiations from U.S. presidents in the future, particularly from Clinton.
This is the documentary that focused on peacemaking between Palestinians and Israelis from Cap David held by then-US President Bill Cliton, Yasser Arafat, and then-Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak to the death of Arafat and assassination of the HAMAS' spiritual leader Sheikh Afmed Yassin.
Camp David was promising in that Barak offered Palestinians painful concession of East Jerusalem. Arafat was adamant regarding the Temple Mount and custodianship was not enough, but knew that this is the best option he could ever have with Israel and nothing could achieve without compromise. Ariel Sharon's visit to al Aqsa Mosque advocated strong protest known as Second-Intifada or al Aqsa intifada in 2000, making all viable peace solution impossible. Besides, coming election of Israel made Barak unwilling to further peace process. In spite of the Arab League's statement to recognize the right of Israel to exist, peacemaking did not proceed even 1 inch ahead. Not to be seen inactive to settle conflict, Two-state solution came out of U.S. interest to get support from Arab countries to launch Iraq War. As a result of terrorist attack during Passover in Israel, Arafat was criticized for not trying to stop terrorist's act, and Israeli army initiated retaliation. Despite Powell's sole initiative to visit Arafat, second-intifada never ended. As always, the conflict falls into the problem of which side stops violence fist. Hamas' attack inflamed Sharon and caused further retaliation in West Bank while Israel's assassination of extremists' leaders inflames and determines suicide bombers.
Israel never allowed the U.N. to inquire into Jenin with help of the U.S. after total destruction. It is true that this is the war not between Palestinians and Israelis, but between extremists and moderates. Israeli security will never be accomplished through the construction of border as proven by the fact that a few suicide bombers can still get through into Israel. Exactly like the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, security through the use of power perpetuates violence. Barack Obama is now facing the need to change the direction the U.S. is heading from old tactics of unilateral use of power that Bush adopted to new strategy of cooperation, and so does Israel.
Learning about the “cascade of dialogues” prior to viewing “Elusive Peace” enabled me to receive the film in a way that I probably would not have otherwise. Knowing that the most likely conditions for which peace is necessary have already been established, but not achieved, is heartbreaking. The “cascade of dialogues” is a phenomenon that will never cease to exist. In that sense, its very existence will forever impede the peace process. The catch-22 is that dialogue remains paramount to getting anything accomplished at all.
As we saw in the film, the Camp David Summit in 2000 proved even if an agreement is reached, the proposed must be sold to the people of Israel and the Palestinians. It was apparent that Arafat and the Palestinians were being offered the short end of the stick and no one wants that. Even in the hearts of those who want peace, lay the fear of being rejected by his people. For example, Egypt’s Anwar al-Sadat who first waged the October War, then signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. He ultimately wanted peace, but his assassinators did not.
While land acquisition remains volatile for the Israelis, land retention is paramount for the Palestinians. The fact that Israel proceeds in occupying the West Bank and Gaza, which are supposed to be completely controlled by Palestinians, is tragic. I understand that Israel’s security is key, but what about living life for the Palestinians? I suppose that carries no weight.
The film has led me to believe that the generations that have taken part in peace talks and dialogues (thus far) must die off in order to get anywhere. As cynical as that sounds, many leaders today have fought in the name of their respective peoples and would be damned if they made any concessions to the other side. This is unfortunate seeing as how Palestinian-Israeli peace is going nowhere fast. Future generations have greater potential to bring about change since they are aware that past attempts at achieving peace have proven futile.
14 comments:
The PBS documentary Elusive Peace: Israel and the Arabs is a really informative work that gives a window into the complicated peace process that exists within the Middle East. With much of the details having occurred almost a dozen years ago, my knowledge is quite limited as my attention was directed towards other topics, not exactly Israel and Palestine. Perhaps the most eye opening aspect of the negotiations were just how big of a role theatrics. It was shocking to see and hear some of the methods that were resorted to by all sides.
The most glaring example of this can be seen when the two Middle Eastern leaders, Yasser Arafat and Ehud Barak, are seen trying to enter into the barracks at a site of peace talks here in the United States. After President Bill Clinton entered into the barracks, the two Middle Eastern leaders had an almost comical sequence where both were trying to get the other leader to enter first; it was Three Stooges-esqe. My take is what hope can there be for peace in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine when their leaders can not even do something as simple as walk through a door-way without starting some trouble.
The documentary as a whole was not overly optimistic towards peace being able to be reached. What is probably the most depressing feature is that the feeling I got was that both of the leaders, Arafat and Barak, truly wanted peace. In the beginning we see Barak and President Assad of Syria try to come to an agreement about the Golan Heights, a topic which Barak had started. While Barak would ultimately decide he could not discuss completely reverting back to the 1967 lines in Syria, I get the impression to do so would have been political suicide; and considering that peace with Syria was not the ultimate goal, it would not have made sense. As we saw when Barak started negotiations with Arafat, Israeli nationalists such as Ariel Sharon seized that opportunity to make their move. They argued that Barak was giving away Israel and did not have the best interests of Israel at heart. It was the “concessions” which Barak made to try and reach peace that sparked the switch to the Likud party and more importantly Ariel Sharon. I feel that while Barak may at times not have done all that he could have done to reach a peace agreement with Arafat; a peace was much more reachable under him than it was under Sharon. If for no other reason than that Sharon self-admittedly did not like nor trust Arafat at all. Sharon hampered the chances for peace quite a bit by virtually making Arafat a prisoner in the last months of his life, not allowing him to leave his compound in Palestine.
Elusive Peace a documentary directed by Norma Percy discussed the peace process that slipped through the fingers of the Palestinians, as Jerusalem became the focal point of what was to happen. Ehud Burak and Yassar Arafat dung the Camp David peace talks during the Clinton administration said Jerusalem was the point of it all.
While Clinton to pressured Ehud Burak work on giving up East Jerusalem Ehud finally conceded and east Jerusalem along with the top of the temple mount to be that Palestinians capital. The problem was how Yassar Arafat. Was seen he would be assasinated if in fact he did not go along with what the Palestinians wanted which is the bottom of the temple mount as well. Although Ehud Burak quickly changed his opinin on not conceding Jerusalem to save face, he did not do that until Arafat said no to the peace plan concerning Israel.
Matters did not help during this time when Ariel Sharon visited the mosque on the temple mount from which an intifada stemmed. It seemed like Ariel Sharon was provoking the Palestinian people. Just like his ruthlessness, before in Lebanon he would be just as ruthless toward the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; the repercussions after thirty Israelis died in a suicide bombing on Passover. Would this of happened had Camp David been successful? Would it not be something to have at least East Jerusalem as a Palestinian capital even if that did not include the bottom o the temple of the mount? While suicide bombing is an atrocious immoral act, after all what does an eleven year old have to do with the peace process, is a full scale military attack and siege killing many civilian Palestinians a necessary action? Whole neighborhoods were destroyed and while Yassar Arafat was under siege at his compound and quarantined there for 2 years until his death.
Yassar Arafat never saw the dismantling of settlements in Gaza Strip but because of this concession done by Ariel Sharon in return he wanted the United Sates to agree that there was no longer a right of return for Palestinian refugees and that the wall that infringed on Palestinian land past the 1967 green line was to stay the way it was. President Bush agreed and there again was a step backward toward a fair vision of how that Palestinian people should be viewed in this peace process. Come up with a peace process that all can agree on, dismantle settlements, give the Palestinians their land that goes back to the United Nations resolution 242 back to green line. Give East Jerusalem as their capital, tear down the wall, and stop checkpoints into Jerusalem so people can visit their holy sights. This is a lot to accomplish but if Israel concedes to Palestine truly and fairly, will there be a need for terrorist’s attacks? Unlikely as Jews and Palestinians lived harmoniously side-by-side before the 48 war they can again do the same if the average people of the countries, not the higher politicians have a say.
The Elusive Peace provided insight into not just the actions of the players involved in the peace process, but also into their points of view and thoughts which dictated those actions. One important element I learned from the movie is the importance that emotion and lack of trust play in the failures of talks. For instance, when the Israeli delegation landed in DC, Prime Minister Barak refused to get off the plane due to his fear of the political backlash he was sure would follow. Even though he had made a rational choice to negotiate face to face with the Syrians, Barak’s last minute fear and lack of trust of Assad almost prevented a meeting from happening. Though the meeting would end up happening, the Barak’s fears restricted him from making any real concessions.
This sense of distrust did not only affect the Israeli leader, however. When Clinton told Assad of Barak’s willingness to withdraw to a “commonly agreed upon border”, Assad’s became enraged. To Assad “commonly agreed upon border” really meant the Israelis believed “the Syrians will foul up the lake if we give them access to it.” Instead of working with the Israelis to come to some sort of compromise on the issue of land ownership around the lake, Assad was too offended by his counterpart to respond productively to his offer. While it is impossible to speculate whether a deal would have been made had the men been able to control their emotions and fears, these episodes would make sure that this historic meeting would become a historic failure.
As Barak moved from the failures of the Syrian negotiations and onto talks with Arafat and the Palestinians, emotion and lack of trust continued to play a pivotal role. Metaphorically and humorously displayed by Arafat and Barak as both men refused to walk through a door before the other, the amount of distrust held both sides back from the necessary prerequisites to a peace deal. Without the trust that the other side would meet them half way, the three leaders would fail to agree to a final status on Jerusalem, the most controversial issue of the talks. Barak expressed the situation by saying he felt like a trapeze artist about to make a jump, but he wasn’t sure his partner was ready to catch him. He feared that if he compromised even an inch on Jerusalem, and a deal fell through, his political opponents would call him a traitor to Israel. (This, in fact, would be the exact strategy deployed by Sharon to win the upcoming elections). Arafat had a similar anxiety, though he believed more than just his political career would die with if he made the wrong move. He feared that by agreeing to anything less than complete ownership over Al Haram Al Sharif would lead to his assassination. While Clinton attempted a last ditch effort, these fears would prove to be stronger than his negotiating skills.
Though The Elusive Peace highlights the failed Camp David negotiations, there are a lot of positives to take from the movie as well. Most importantly, we must understand the monumental accomplishment of both sides coming together to talk. Before the Oslo Accords in 1993, the mere idea that the Israeli Prime Minister would meet with Yasser Arafat to discuss the final status of Jerusalem was one held by dreamers alone. Furthermore, while the Israelis and Palestinians failed to agree on Jerusalem, they did come to an understanding on many of the other important issues. These tentative understandings are now the base for future negotiations.
Finally, we must learn the lessons from the failures of the past. The greatest lesson America must understand is that its presence is necessary if there is to be a deal. By getting personally involved in the conflict, Clinton came closer than any other President to achieving peace. Because of the distrust high levels of emotion between the Israelis and Palestinians, America is required to act as a moderate broker when the talks stall. The American President must successfully counteract the strong forces of fear and distrust which have plagued Israelis and Palestinians if America hopes to bring an end to this conflict.
I admit that I had heard only a very few arguments favoring Chairman Arafat’s position following Camp David, and while I sympathized with the Palestinians, I wasn’t certain of what exactly had been offered. I do know that the “deal” was alleged to be the “best deal the Palestinian people would ever receive.Since I watched this film, I have read a bit more about just what was actually offered at Camp David and it seems that the offers represented nothing new or different.
The Palestinians were offered a state and a capital in Jerusalem in return for agreeing that this ended all claims on Israel. Fine, as far as it goes. But they were also offered about 92% of the territory in the West Bank and Gaza and they had a right to demand 100% of it. Israel retained control of Palestinian borders, but the Palestinians needed to control their own borders. Some sections of Arab Jerusalem would be incorporated into the Palestinian state, but Palestinians wanted all sections of Jerusalem with majority Arab populations to be included in their state. Free access to the holy sites of Islam and Christianity was offered as long as those sites were supervised by the Israeli army, but Palestinians expected free access without Israeli supervision. Israel would control the Temple Mount, but Palestinians demanded complete sovereignty over the Temple Mount, a sacred place to their faith. Israel would have retained a military presence in Palestine including check points it determined necessary, but Palestinians wanted no Israeli military presence and no checkpoints. Finally, since three million refugees would remain in refugee camps after negotiations were to have been completed, there is no way that Palestinians could sign off on all future claims against Israel.
I am disappointed in the general media, and in the Jewish media in particular, for failing to report the specifics of the offers made.
This film illustrated the complete lack of trust between the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. I thought it also showed the close ties between American and Israeli leaders that seem to take peace negotiations down the wrong course. In the beginning of the film, Clinton was even going so far as to admit that he was trying to “sell” a peace plan to the Palestinians on Barak’s behalf. A Palestinian negotiator saw the plan as a collection of hasty decisions which was not acceptable. This seemed to mirror the fact that the Clinton administration put the Camp David Accords together at the end of his second term as president.
During the process, the Americans and the Israelis worked out a plan that was acceptable for Israel, and then took that plan to the Palestinians. In the end, Barak would not give up Jerusalem because he saw it as political suicide. Arafat refused to sign a peace deal without some part of Jerusalem for the Palestinians because he, too, saw it as political suicide. Both sides balked on the same issue. However, at the end of the negotiations, it was the Palestinians who were labeled as terrorists who were impeding the peace process.
This film was very useful in giving viewers insight into the actual goings on during a peace negotiation. The scene where the two leaders could not agree on who would walk through the door first was simply ridiculous. There is a lot of symbolism involved in negotiations. That scene was one example, but during the process there is always the question of who is going to give up what for what purpose. Ideology, power, identity and security are only a few of the factors that go into the decision-making process. Jerusalem has been elevated to a symbol for both groups, and giving it up has come to mean giving up a peace of their identity. Either that perception will have to change for there to be peace, or there will need to be new leaders who are more committed to peace than to symbols.
I feel that this was a documentary that truly gives a deeper understanding of the mechanisms of peace talks, and, after having seen the film, it would be difficult for anyone to say that either side ‘doesn’t want peace’ or ‘isn’t willing to compromise.’ The peace process does not merely include those sitting at the negotiating table or the people whom they represent. This video shows how political climate and clout of others not at the negotiating table can influence those who are and how political support is so essential. For example, it seemed to me that Barak wanted to make further concessions and work towards peace; however, he knew that by doing so, he would be committing political suicide. For even the small concessions he offered, he highly criticized by Zionist extremists in the government upon his return. And then, to send the point home to the Palestinians that there would be no concessions, Sharon scheduled a walk around the captured Palestinian holy sites.
I picked up on a slightly less than hopeful outlook on future negotiations’ outcome throughout the documentary and can understand it. The documentary shows how, in order to achieve an acceptable and long-lasting peace, many variables must all simultaneously coalesce. Both Palestinian and Israeli negotiators need to be compromising actors with enough popularity from their constituents that they can confidently propose concessions without fear of their own political demise. In addition to this seemingly improbable set of circumstances, the US must have strong leadership and an administration that has accomplished an overhaul in foreign policy towards these negotiations. The US’s responsibility and role would have to be greater than currently whereby this country would stop diminishing its credibility with the Palestinians, hold both parties to their pre-established agreements, and stop letting either side influence US policy. With the need for all of these variables to simultaneously coalesce, one can understand the documentary’s bleak and dismal undertones.
This documentary focusing on the peace process between the Palestinians and the Israelis with the United States playing a mediating role helps us understand the lasting difficulty of these peace negotiations. The major players that were documented in this film were Prime Minister Ehud Barak for the Israeli camp, Yassir Arafat for the Palestinian camp, and the President Bill Clinton representing the mediating US camp. This film shows how difficult negotiating between the Israelis and the Palestinians can be and has been for several years, even with the strong hand of US intervention interceding to foster good relations.
The interesting thing to me about this documentary is the complete and utter reliance of the Israelis and Palestinians alike on the US mediation to ensure both side are represented fairly and equally. General opinion of the US and the west in the Middle East is unfavorable but the recurring need expressed by Arafat and the Palestinians for US involvement seems contrary to general public opinion.
There are several aspects of these Camp David negotiations which worked against the overall goal of a peace treaty. The major difficulties center around the negotiations regarding Jerusalem, which is an aspect of negotiations that neither the Israelis nor Palestinians were willing to make concessions. However the film plainly depicted these needs as being represented by their respective constituency. The personal views of both Barak and Arafat convey the want to make concessions on the topic of Jerusalem. However they both plainly state again, that making any concessions on Jerusalem will surely be received with contempt from their respective people and may even result in attempts on their life by their own people. This part of the film showed the true determination for these individual political players to make peace but bound by the limitations of holding a position which represents the larger constituency. This conflict increases the probability of peace negotiations failing at Camp David.
Another aspect of the Camp David negotiations which counter acted progression deals with the role of the US mediation between the Israelis and the Palestinians. President Bill Clinton allowed both parties to use him as a mediator and a facilitator for the peace negotiations. In the beginning, it was made clear that peace talks will be relayed from one side to President Clinton who would then present the terms to the opposing side. This set up for negotiating completely devauled the role of the President of the United States to a point where his influence and participation worked to make negotiations more complex rather than more conducive for peace. Due to the historical relations with Israel, President Clinton seemed to be more available to the Israeli side. Clinton would hear Barak's proposals and take them to Arafat who would always find problems and refuse. However Clinton did not always take Arafats plans back to Barak but rather went to Barak to reformulate their plan. This favoritism, whether consciously or unconsciously shown to the Israelis, worked to anger Arafat and the Palestinian camp to a point where they no longer trusted the American mediation to objectively conduct fair peace negotiations. This point was outlined in the book by Kurtzer and has proved to be the most apparent reason for the failures of the Camps David negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians brokered by US mediation.
One of the highlight’s of this course was the showing of the PBS documentary,“Elusive Peace”, which began with the Arafat-Barak meeting during the time period of 1999-2001. It is notable for its candid glimpses of personal distrust, anger and political fears and maneuvering. The Machiavellian themed ploys were text-book examples of how-not-to-negotiate-peace.
Barak’s strategy for dealing with Palestinians was to start side-negotiations with Syria,but Syria politely declined to participate in peace talks until Israel withdrew back from seized lands to pre-1967 borders. American Secretary of State Madeline Albright met with Assad thinking that Barak would then enter into meaningful peace negotiations; however, he refused because he felt that voters in Israel would reject his re-election if preconditions that showed Israeli land give-backs became an issue with his political opponents. The documentary suggests strongly that for the Israeli leadership, politics were more persuasive than peace.
Barak claimed his rejection of Assad’s overtures was due to Israel’s need to maintain land around Sea of Galilee as it provides 30% of the nation’s fresh water. However this land was Syrian territory seized in 1967.
In Geneva in 2000 President Clinton invited Assad to a meeting in this neutral Swiss site as he believed that Israel would have specific peace plans to advance.
Israel balked, embarrassed Clinton, the meeting failed: Assad died 3 months later. Without concern for American diplomacy or Syrian bitterness, Israel shrugged off this orchestrated failure with Syria and turned to Palestine. Barak, as further evidence that peace for Israel was a matter of tactical delays and anti-Palestinian accusations, continued to expand settlements, even as it cynically called for peace. But Arafat simultaneously called for East Jerusalem to be the Palestinian capital and Israeli capital, much like Rome is a two-nation capital: head of the Vatican and the Italian government.
As Barak and Arafat played political chess, Clinton prepared a summit at Camp David for July 2000. Barak defiantly stated he would never agree to a two- country capital, primarily to appease hawks in Israel. As this part of the film made its points, it became obvious that politics and personal agendas dominate the peace process.
I was amazed and angered that the USA initially and meekly allowed Barak to reject the American call for a two-state capital city. And this rudeness to Clinton and Arafat, after calling for the summit, was galling, especially his refusal to negotiate directly with Arafat. Clinton soon demanded that Barak be flexible and was visibly angry that he was being treated poorly by Israel. Barak kept up the pretense of serious negotiation by making a pathetic counter offer of a few villages outside Jerusalem .Clinton exploded, and demanded that Barak directly hand this unacceptable offer to Arafat as it wasn’t acceptable to the United States.
The film poignantly sloshes through more jabbing as for example, Barak finally offered half of Jerusalem to Palestine(the Muslim and Christian quarters)and Arafat ‘s anger grew as Israeli’s tactics were insulting and humiliating, especially the demand to give up sovereignty over a holy Muslim site.
Back in Israel, Sharon re-enters the ongoing saga with accusations that Barak is selling out. Angry and disappointed, Clinton went to Okinawa for the G-8 summit talks and left the two Middle East protagonists to work things out even as Sharon prepared to provoke Palestinians by walking with armed guards onto Temple Mount. Predictably, Palestinians protested, Israelis opened fire, killing seven Arabs, and peace talks ground to a halt. Just as Sharon and militant Arabs wanted. Elusive peace? No. Officially Sabotaged Peace is the accurate title.
Israel and the Arabs: An Elusive Peace gives a chronological account of the Camp David negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians with the United States as a mediator. I was surprised to see Ehud Barak's initial openness to peace negotiations with both Syria and Yassir Arafat. His decision to initiate peace talks and then back off is just one illustration of the numerous impediments to the peace process. The film switches from the accounts of the respective heads of state to their lower level staff. The film goes beyond the press releases shown on television and published in newspapers after these talks and gives us an opportunity to see the key players explain their thought process during the negotiations and their perceptions of everyone else involved.
My main question after watching this film is what could have happened if the peace negotiations had actually succeeded. If Ehud Barak had actually gone through with brokering a peace deal with Syria where would Israeli-Syrian relations be today? Had Ehub Barak been more flexible about meeting with Yassir Arafat himself could there have been more successful negotiations? Could they have been successful had Arafat accepted the plan presented to him? It's possible had the peace deal with Syria worked out in 2000, Iran would have far less leverage in the region than it does today. Beyond that it's difficult to say what actually could have happened. The fact that Ehud Barak stayed away from Yassir Arafat gives a rather bleak impression of Israel's openness to a bilateral peace agreement although it's possible reduced interaction could have helped in terms of reducing the number of harsh confrontation between the two. The documentary shows the difficult position Arafat was placed in by being presented with such a bad peace deal. Although the blame is typically placed on Arafat for saying no, the film shows just how raw the deal really was.
The Elusive Peace detailed the actions of the major players during the Clinton administration, as well as how and why the talks broke down. The two major negotiations depicted in the film were the Syrian negotiations, and the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in the United States. There were some common themes we can gather from each negotiation, and use as lessons for future U.S. negotiating strategy.
First, it is clear that U.S. mediation is a necessary precondition for any peace talks to be successful or productive. In the cases present in the movie, distrust and harsh rhetoric proved a sufficient barrier to productive negotiation, so a middle-man role would be important to the talks. This role has some necessary parts. First, ample preparation is necessary, as entering negotiations with an empty satchel proved disastrous twice in the film. In Syria, the talks lasted a very short time due to a lack of U.S. alternative plans and detailed strategy. In Camp David, the U.S. did not have sufficient alternative solutions, and was reduced to being an emmissary from Israel. Secondly, the U.S. should develop a firm independent policy, and not allow itself to act on the whims of other actors, as it has for Israel in the past.
The other main theme that U.S. negotiators can remember for successful future peace talks is that Presidential action should be thought out carefully, and employed strategically. The devotion that President Clinton displayed towards achieving an agreement was commendable, but his actions served to devalue the role of the office at times. In the future, lower level emmissaries should be utilized before the president, especially when the U.S. is not adequately prepared for a conclusive peace negotiation. Therefore, the prestige of the office will be greater, and thus more effective in the fewer instances that it is utilized, and could perhaps increase the chances for success. For example, when Clinton met with Assad in Syria, he was unprepared, and thus demonstrated a reduced capacity for negotiations. As a result Assad would perhaps be less likely to accept invitations to negotiations from U.S. presidents in the future, particularly from Clinton.
This is the documentary that focused on peacemaking between Palestinians and Israelis from Cap David held by then-US President Bill Cliton, Yasser Arafat, and then-Prime Minister of Israel Ehud Barak to the death of Arafat and assassination of the HAMAS' spiritual leader Sheikh Afmed Yassin.
Camp David was promising in that Barak offered Palestinians painful concession of East Jerusalem. Arafat was adamant regarding the Temple Mount and custodianship was not enough, but knew that this is the best option he could ever have with Israel and nothing could achieve without compromise. Ariel Sharon's visit to al Aqsa Mosque advocated strong protest known as Second-Intifada or al Aqsa intifada in 2000, making all viable peace solution impossible. Besides, coming election of Israel made Barak unwilling to further peace process. In spite of the Arab League's statement to recognize the right of Israel to exist, peacemaking did not proceed even 1 inch ahead. Not to be seen inactive to settle conflict, Two-state solution came out of U.S. interest to get support from Arab countries to launch Iraq War. As a result of terrorist attack during Passover in Israel, Arafat was criticized for not trying to stop terrorist's act, and Israeli army initiated retaliation. Despite Powell's sole initiative to visit Arafat, second-intifada never ended. As always, the conflict falls into the problem of which side stops violence fist. Hamas' attack inflamed Sharon and caused further retaliation in West Bank while Israel's assassination of extremists' leaders inflames and determines suicide bombers.
Israel never allowed the U.N. to inquire into Jenin with help of the U.S. after total destruction.
It is true that this is the war not between Palestinians and Israelis, but between extremists and moderates. Israeli security will never be accomplished through the construction of border as proven by the fact that a few suicide bombers can still get through into Israel. Exactly like the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan, security through the use of power perpetuates violence. Barack Obama is now facing the need to change the direction the U.S. is heading from old tactics of unilateral use of power that Bush adopted to new strategy of cooperation, and so does Israel.
Learning about the “cascade of dialogues” prior to viewing “Elusive Peace” enabled me to receive the film in a way that I probably would not have otherwise. Knowing that the most likely conditions for which peace is necessary have already been established, but not achieved, is heartbreaking. The “cascade of dialogues” is a phenomenon that will never cease to exist. In that sense, its very existence will forever impede the peace process. The catch-22 is that dialogue remains paramount to getting anything accomplished at all.
As we saw in the film, the Camp David Summit in 2000 proved even if an agreement is reached, the proposed must be sold to the people of Israel and the Palestinians. It was apparent that Arafat and the Palestinians were being offered the short end of the stick and no one wants that. Even in the hearts of those who want peace, lay the fear of being rejected by his people. For example, Egypt’s Anwar al-Sadat who first waged the October War, then signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. He ultimately wanted peace, but his assassinators did not.
While land acquisition remains volatile for the Israelis, land retention is paramount for the Palestinians. The fact that Israel proceeds in occupying the West Bank and Gaza, which are supposed to be completely controlled by Palestinians, is tragic. I understand that Israel’s security is key, but what about living life for the Palestinians? I suppose that carries no weight.
The film has led me to believe that the generations that have taken part in peace talks and dialogues (thus far) must die off in order to get anywhere. As cynical as that sounds, many leaders today have fought in the name of their respective peoples and would be damned if they made any concessions to the other side. This is unfortunate seeing as how Palestinian-Israeli peace is going nowhere fast. Future generations have greater potential to bring about change since they are aware that past attempts at achieving peace have proven futile.
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